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PREFACE

For at least the last five centuries of recorded' history, Southeast
Asians have been conspicuously divided into peoples of the hills
and of the plains. Hjghlanders have tended to be independent
animists living in small communities isolated by war or terrain,
·without developed systems of either kinship or peonage and ordering their lives according to custom and oral tradition. .Their lowland
. neighbors, exposed to the greater traditions of Buddhism, Islam or
Christianity, lived in more complex worlds with courts and chronicles, plazas and cathedrals. They made obeisance and paid tribute
to devarajahs, sultans or governors-general Southeast Asians of the
plains stereotyped the mountain people .as primitive, hostile and ·
naive. Hill tribesmen considered lowlanders arrogant, weak and
deceitful. Though trade patterns produced varying degrees of
economic symbiosis, mutual antipathy between highlander and
lowlander was the norm.
Western colonial authority intruded into this Southeast Asian
world and virtually without exception (and, indeed, virtually without regard for geographical, cultural or temporal limits) developed
relations with highland peoples that were largely congenial, in
contrast to·the inimical colonial relationships with lowland cultures.
Low.b uid, national heroes in Southeast Asia are those of the resis.tarice to colonial authority-the Bonifacios, Sukarnos and Ho
Chi Minns. The highland minorities treasure positive. communal
recollections of this same foreign presence. Westerners have been
admitted to the popular pantheon of folk heroes among such
disparate groups as the Ifugaos of Luzon, the Kachin of Burma,
the Rhade of Vietnam and the Semang of Malaysia. Around the
evening fires old men of KaJinga tell tales of the courageous warrior
and great judge Sapao (Walter F. Hale). The Shan spin similar
stories of Shway Yoe (Sir James George Scott).
••
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The purpose of this stud·y is to aamine the Philippine experience, the fascinating but hitherto .u ntold story of interaction
.
between the American colonial authorities and the independent,
headhunting, terrace-building people of Luzon's Gran Cordillera
Central. The picture which emerges is drawn as muc.h as possible
fron1 accounts of the participants themselves, a ''people's eye
view'' of history. It focuses primarily on . the province of Ifugao,
for the American presence there was lQngest and best-remembered.
Despite the great cultural differences between turn-of-the-century
Ifugaos and Americans, the oral accounts·which make up this story
porµ-ay for us an intriguing relationship-a mutually satisfactory
symbiosis due in large measure to an unexpected congruence of
important cultural values.
·Both the Ifugaos and the American aposl held personal courage
and fighting ability in the highest regard. Battles between them
often ended with the words ''We had a good fight.'' The American
concept of ''playing fair and square'' resulted in a simple, common
sense system of justice comprehensible to the Ifugaos. The white
apos made deliberate use of Ifugao magical/ spiritual elements to
authority. On feast days, Ifugao· warriors were chal. reinforce their
lenged . to publicly demonstrate the protective powers of their
hiwang : (tali~,n). When a rifle .slug shattered the charm, the
superior spiritu~ power of the apo was effectively demonstrated.for
all to se~. Even the relationships which developed between the
American apos and Ifugao women mirrored traditional Ifugao behavioral patterns and proved to be agreeable to both parties.
Where American p~licy decreed change in lfugao customs, the
white apos
attempted
to utilize
existing indigenous systems to
.
.
.
deflect Ifugao opposition. In prohibiting headhunting, for example,
·t~e a.po recognized. the Ifugao demand for vengeance and ·made
him~elf the agent, saying, ''I'll be the one to get your revenge.'' In
matters of justice, .Ifugao ·headmen w~re routinely consulted
during
.
investigation
and settlement. In many cases the American merely
.
placed Qis imprimatur 9n. a decision reached by Ifugao leaders. .
On occasion the white apos qeliberately violated-American government regulations in order to achieve a resolution acceptable to the
Ifugaos.
.
New trails encouraged communication and helped to create a
~nse of Ifugao iqentity. Schools were opened, literate Ifugaos·soon
were employed ·in government service and by independence were
participating fully in the Philippine political system. In Ifugao
.

,
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modernization brought no severe dislocations. Changes occurred
gradually, their impact ameliorated by the care American apos took
to develop a sympathetic understanding of Ifugao ways and act
whenever possible in consonance with Ifugao custom. They were
in turn liked and respected by the Ifugaos because the actions of
the apo mericano 2 w~e explainable in Ifugao terms. .
The indigenous sources for this research are primarily oral. Over
one hundred interviews were conducted during the period 1971- ·
197 4 with a broad range of participants in the American government of the Cordillera and the province of Ifugao in particular.
Respondents included government officials (former governors,
,rfilage headmen, clerks, constabulary soldiers, teachers), nonofficials in close contact with the white apos (wives, children,
servants, relatives, friends) and non-officials
with limited contact
•
(barrio dwellers, merchants, participants in trail-build~g, legal cases
and caiiaos).3 While a significant number of the. best-informed .
respondents sp9ke English, a majority of the interviews were conducted in local dialects throµgh interpreters. 4
· The most valuable information regarding the apos' percept1ons
comes from hitherto unknown or unused r~cords of the American
participants themselves. Autobiographical manuscripts, important
documents and personal pap~rs of all three American governors of
Ifugao (Jefferson Davis Gallman, Owen A. Tomlin$0n a:nq William
E. Dosser) have been uncovered, along with similar sources left
, by
American officials stationed in other areas of the Cordillera (John
C. Early-teacher in Kalinga and Bontoc, lieutenant governor of
Amburayan and Bontoc, governor of Mounta.i n Provin~e; John
Evans-lieutenant governor of Amburayan and Bontoc; Charles W.
Olson-Thomasite teacher and treasurer of Mountain Province from
1909-1916).
Archival collections of significance for this study include documents and . papers of David P. Barrows, H. -Otley Beyer, Charles
Henry Brent, Willi~m Cameron Forbes, Francis Burton Harrison,
Joseph R. Hayden and Dean C. Worcester. The holdings of the
Bureau of Insular Affairs of the National Archives contain personnel files, manuscript reports of provincial governors and other documents of importance. Finally, a few first-hand accounts ·of American-Ifugao interaction have been published, with those of Roy F.
Barton having particular value for this study.

•
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Chapter I
SETTING THE STAGE

Geographical Features
The Gran Cordillera Central, the most prominent geographical
feature of northern Luzon, rise~· abruptly from the fertile central
plain of Luzon some 200 kilometers above Manila and continues
northward for another 250 kilometers before falling away to the
sea. Tl)e Cordillera >s average elevation varies from 1000 to 1500
meters while its highest peaks stretch upward some 3000 meters.
The mountain chain forms a rugged barrier between the narrow
coastal plain of Ilocos on t~e west and the broad ·valley of· the
Cagayan River on the east, and provides a homeland for six major
highland groups known collectively as Igorotsl but _separately ·and
more properly as the Ibaloi, Ka~kanay, Ifugao, Bon~oc, Kalinga and
Apayao (or Isneg).
The Ifugao culture-area is located in an eastern and southern
region of the Gran Cordillera Central. To the west the Mt. Dat.a
range separates the lfugaos from the Kankanays of Benguet and
·on the north and west the province is bounded by Mt. Polis, Mt.
Amuyao and the Bontoc-people. On the south and southeast Ifugao
is insulated from the plains of Nueva Vizcaya and Isabela by a
sparsely populated, malaria-ridden zone of ·grass-covered, rolling
hills. With the exception of the 200-~ectare2 Lagawe plateau the
terrain consists of precipitous mountains cut by short, sw~t tributaries of the Cagayan River. The mountain slopes are covered wjth
dense tropical forest or, p~icularly in the drier eastern regions, by
thick, knife-edged cogon grass.
·
Cultural Background
.The most populous of the six cqlture-groups inhabiting the
Cordillera, the Ifugaos (from lpugao, meaning mortals or ''people
on earth',) are particularly noted for extensive, well-irrigated rice
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terrace systems which often extend up the mountainsides for 500
meters or more. Lengthy irrigation canals are frequently cut into
the steep ·slopes to bring water to the t~rraces from mountain
springs several kilometers away, en route crossing vertical cliffs or
deep canyons in troughs made from hollowed tree trunks. The
nearly perpendicular walls of the terraces are constructed of stones
fitted together without mortar and commonly exceed five meters
in height. The te~ain on which the terraces are built is so precipitous that the height of the wall often exceeds the width of the rice
field produced by building it.
other mountain peoples, who often plant two crops of
Unlike
•
rice each year, the Ifugaos traditionally plant only one. The rice
produced is large-grained and of excellent quality, but the limitation of one planting per year means that only the wealthiest lfugaos
are able to eat rice (the preferred food) year round. The staple
for mo's t Ifugaos is the camote (sweet potato) grown in catngins
(swiddens) slashed and burned onto the slopes surrounding every
lfugao settlement. The. diet is supplemented by products of hunting (chiefly
. . wild boar and deer) and gath~ring in nearby forests.
Chic:kens, pigs and occasionally carabaos are domesticated and
raised by the Ifugaos but these animals are kept for sacrifice to the
anitos (ancestral spirits) and are rarely,·if ever, killed just for food.
The .lfugaos, like the other highland groups of northern Luzon,
are by tradition animists and believe that all matter has both corporeal and incorporeal existence. .T he complex Ifugao cosmology
includes a bewildering variety of spirit·beings, good and evil, who
are assumed to be involved to varying degrees in the affairs of
human. beings. As a means of propitiating the anitos animals are:
sacrificed at cafiaos (spirit-feasts)!'
The spirit-beings
devour
the soul
.
.
.
of the animal and leave the flesh for the human celebrants, a cir:cumstance which often provides the poorer lfugaos with their only
, opportuni~y to eat meat.
Providing such . opportunities was one method by which the
most influential Ifugaos maintained their status in traditional Ifugao
~ociety. A~ong the lfugaos there existed an upper class of notables
(kadangyan), a rank most often based on wealth, but one which was
also accessible through demonstration of valor
, in battle or oratorical ability and wise counsel. Kadangyan status provided its holders
with the right of consultation on matters (?f community concern
and varying degrees of -moral authority over those .o f lower social
standing, . but a kadangyan's influence had limitations. Friar Juan

2

Villaverde, the best Spanish. chronicler of the Ifugaos, noted in the
late 1800's.that:
... the lfugaos have no king,' nor ruler. They pay tribute to
no one. Each is the absolute monarch of his house and person, and although this individual liberty is one of the principal causes of their miserable and almost anarchical state,
it is certain that it is one of their most dominant passions.a
.

These independent Ifugaos c~stomarily lived in hundreds of
small settlements (called rancherias by Spaniards and. Americans)
which typically consisted, not of compact villages, but of scattered
hamlets (sitios) of a few houses each. rh.e re were no public buildings, and ~ settlement of fewer than 1000 people might_well be
spread across 500 or 6.0 0 vertical meters of terrace sy_stem and extend along a river valley-for several kilometers. Traditio~al garb for
the .men was the wanoh, a loin-cloth popularly referred to as a
g-string, and women wore the tapis~ a short skirt which ended above
the knees. Both garments were made by women, originally from
pounded sheets of tree bark. By the 1800's :t hey. were commonly
made · of cloth woven on Ifugao back-looms using. thread _obtained
by trade with the lowlands. The men did basketry and woodcarving
while certain rancherias, especially Hapao, were known for expert
metalworkers who pro.d uced tools and. accessories of war such as
spearheads and double-edged fighting bolos.
The Ifugaos, like the . other mountain tribes, .were inveterate
headhunters. Valor., more than oratorical ability or even wealth, was
the .badge of leadership among the lfugaos, and lfugaos enthusiastically sought the honor which a~crued to the taker of human
heads. Raiding w~ the norm . . Small bands of six or eight men
stealthily slipped into enemy .territory, waite<:I · in ambush for
passers-by .or work~rs in the fields, $peared and beheaded their
victims, and then raced for the safety of home territory ·before the
alarm could be given,
With ·.h ead-taking the ideal and blood~vengeance for such losses
a requirement, a perpetual .state of fe\ld existed in Ifugao until the
American imposition of an external orde~ in the first decade of.the
t'Yentieth century. Though ad hoc alliances· were occasionally
formed, · lfugao rancherias were -independent and recognized .nQ
suzerain. Friendly relatioQs might exist between .settlements in close
proximity to one another, bu.t in mo:s t cases to leave the ~mediate
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vicinity of one's ·ranch·e ria was to court ·decapitation.. The danger
of travel, the · difficulty of the terrain and the essential self-sufficiency of each community resulted, as years passed, in a pattern
of introversion characterized by a parochial i~entification with the
home village (perceived as an extended kin-group), a general suspicion of .non-kin, significant dialect differences and political independence. 4
The Spanish Experience
The lfugao way of life continued undisturbed by Spanish in~ursions for almost two centuries after Miguel Lopez de Legaspi began
the conquest of the Philippines for Spain. It · was not until the
1750's that Spanish tr.o ops first fought their way into the Kiangan
region of southern Ifugao in response to headhunting raids against
Spain's ~ilipino5 subjects · living in the Cagayan Valley. Continued
Ifugao ·sorties of this ·nature made it impossible for Spanish authorities to ignore the Ifugaos and punittve expeditions were ordered
into the ·mountains. For the ne.x t century and a half both church
and state· gave varying degrees of attention to ~the difficult task of
catechizing and conttolling these independent pagans . in what
proved to be an unsucce~sful ·effort to bring the Ifugaos·into a state
of Christian .s ubjection similar to that imposed upon their lowland
brothers.
.
Spanish policies .to attain these ends vacillated between persuasion and punishment throughout the.history of Spanish-Ifugao contact, but from the number of priests killed and military eKpeditions
launched. it ·was ·. clear that neither method was very effective in convincing the Ifugaos to· accept either taxation or baptism. Several
e.xpeditions were .launched against southern lfugao beginning in the
1750's. They met with · strong·resistance and one sent in 1193 was
soundly beaten and forced to retreat to the lowlands.
In 1so·1 Friar Juan Molano entered Kiangan alone, the first
missionary to reach that place without the company of a military
force. He was impressed by the industry evident in the terraced
fields and excellent · houses; and· was pennitted to wander about
observing· daily life·. ·Molano broached the .possibility · of staying
permanently in Kiangan but the idea was firmly rejected. The
lfugaos told. him that they were ·willing to be friends and have him ,
visit for· a few days at a time, but that a full-time .priest would not
be permitted. N·evertheless, Molano apparently '.felt·,encouraged by
the ·1fugaos' lack of animosity and 'wrote to-·.a co -worker. ex.pressing
4

.

his opinion that it might not be very difficult to begin mission work
in Kiangan.6
·
Such beginnings were still half a century away, for the following
year Spanish· expeditions were again fighting the Ifugaos. In 1802
troops were sent against Mayoyao and in 1810 Kiangan was fi~rcely
opposing more Spanish expeditions. Guillermo Galvey,: named
Coman~nte General de /garrotes, made repeated efforts to conquer lgorots living in various regions · of the Cordillera, and in 1832
fought his way into Kiangan. He spent two. days destroying 18
sitios and their neighboring fields and in his report on the expedi·tion explained Spanish intentions ·a nd the steps he felt. would be
necessary to achieve them:
•

I

I am persuaded that if two or three· expeditions like this
are made every year in May [i.e. just before harvest] to
destroy their crops, the lgorots will have to· g~ve way., ·pay
tribute and, above ·a11, leave· the Christian towns· in peace,
who don't dare go 100 steps from ·their .homes for fear of
losing their head$ ...7
Whether such tactics would have had the effect Galvey anti•
cipated was problematical for ·other lgorots had abandoned their
terraces· and moved farther into ·t he mountains in the ·face of such
devastation, preferrring camotes and independence_to rice and subjugation. In any event the question remains speculative since ·the
Spanish gov~rnment, whether· for economic ·or policy reasons,
did not field the forces necessary to carry out Galvey's proposed
conquest. Ifugao raids on the lowlands continued, at least partly
because·, in the absence of lfugao overlords~ with wide-ranging ·
authority, the burning of Kiangan 's houses and fields had no effect
on other rancherias'· ··participation
in Christian head-taking. Ten
. .
years ·after Galvey's "destruction of Kiangan.1 Sinibaldo de Mas' Informe sobre el ·es'tado de las Islas .Filipinas· en 1842 (Report on the
State of the Philippine Islands in ·1 842) described the Ifugaos primarily in terms of their ferocious ·attacks in the Cagayan-·Valley:
•

[The lfugaos] are the pagans wh:o live ·east of the missions of Cagayan along the left [west) bank of the· Magat
...···they threaten to have the •id missions com:pletely ~t
their mercy despite the ·expenses and sacrifices the government has made to sustain them·.
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They· have· immense fields of rice, but despite the fact
that they live comfor.tably off the ·f ruits of their labor, they
. take ·a horrible pleasure in lying in wait to murder travellers and, without.robbing .t hem, cut· off their heads, sip their
brains·, and adorri the interior of their ·houses with human
skulls, copsidering those who possess these dreadful trophies
the mo.st · important ... .. Because of these barbarians, travellers passing .from 'Nueva Vizcaya to Cagayan ·have to join·
. in groups of 60 to 80 and take an escort.. . ; ·. 8
In 1847, principally because- of continued Ifugao depredations
in th~ lowlands, Military Governor Mariano· Oscariz of Nueva Vizcaya marched for Mayoyao with a large, well-armed force, destroying everything~in · his path-houses, crops, terraces and irrigation
systemsr Six days later he planted his flag in M~yoyao and offered
the lfugaos a choice between capitulation and total destruction.
The Mayoyaos gave in to Osca:riz .and agreed to pay tribute in rice
as a token of their surrehder to Spanish rule. Forty hostages were
taken to the lowlands to en~ure continued compliance and in 1849
a delegation of prominent Mayoyaos was taken to Malacaiiang
where they offered persol)al submission to the Governor-General. In
, Mayoyao itself the. Ifugaos offered their assistance to·the Spanish
on raids aga~st other independent ranch~ias and also re<tuested
. that a priest be-sent to live with them. Spanjsh· officials and clergy
'Yere delighted with this apparent pag~ri interest in Chri.$t's · ~chings
. . .and in ,1·851 a church, ironically named Nues:tra Senora de los
Dolores del. Mayoyao (Our Lady of Sorrows of .Mayoyao), was
founded amidst much pomp. and pageantry.9
.
·It should be noted, how.ever, that such requests were ·typical
of ··the· perio:d . Friars :saw themselves a:s prot~tors of the ·Igorrotes
and in ~is role ·often . accompa·n ied military ..expeditions, hoping
to cµrb abuses. by ·the·soJdiers. ·The lfuga~s seem to have recognized
· this· and .valued . the presence . of priests as· long .a s '.d etachments of
soldiers .. were stationed . in ·their .r ancherias. T~e priests were .w·e1come in ·Mayoyao · as long. as ,the .Mayoyaos·· ·c ontinued· to· feel the
weight of Spanish arms. However, in a pattern representative of
the ebb and flow .of ·Spanish influeiice on the Cordill~ra, Governor
Oscariz :was:. sent to ·battle .the Muslims..in ·1852,.fugao disenchantment with . the priests · increased . as .Spanish ~ilitary .·strength on
their: .borders declined, the church . was:: bur.µed
:1854.·and the
Mayoyaos were soon back in ·control of ,their territory..: ,
.·. ... .

m;

:6

Though the Mayoyaos
were
able to reassert their independence,
.
.
the frequency of Spanish exp.e ditions into other . Ifugao regions
picked up sharply at· mid-century. _Kiangan was invaded iµ 1849,
Carnbulo in ~853, Hapao and-Bunhia.n in 1.8 54., Ah~n -and Hapao
eight times between iss1 and 1871, and . in 1868 a .large force
armed with all-weather, br.e ech-loa·d ing rifles s~ged an immense
40-day expedition across Ifugao. The ~paniards ·penetrated as far as
Banaue in central . Ifugao anQ at every .r ancheria visited tl)ey receive~ prompt, . .prqmatic pledges of fealty to' Spain. A .f ort ·w as
built in . ~ia~gan . and -a garrison of Spanish officers and· Filipino
soldie;rs . was .assigned to maintain ~ permanent presence
in lfugao.
.
Two years later, .ho:wever, Frµu Victorino Garcia: and ~everal sol. diers of the Kiangan· detachment lo~ their lives to lfugao warriors,
and even the courageous pioneer missionary Juan Villaverde made a
hasty, if temporary, departure from Kiangan w·h en, f o.l lowing_mass,
an Ifugao spear passed thro~gh his vestments and stuck quivering in .
the door
behind , him )..O
.
.
.
.
F~r the next. two decades_the Kµingan garrison .and mission continued to be ~e focu~ o~ the ~pani~h presence in Ifugao for it .w as .
not_until 1889 that t~e final .intensification. of Spanis}:i authority in
lfugao pegan.
lq ·that year
Gov.-Gen.
Yaleria~o
Weyler
establis~ed
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
the Comandancia Politico-Militar de Quiangan (Kiangan PoliticoMilitary_·Command) and by 1892 civil_guard·. posts ..h.a g ··been built
in_ ~e U.µgao r~11;cherias of Ha~ao, Banaue, Ay~ngan .(t;>e~wee.n .
~ u e and Mayoyao) an~ Alimit (between Ayangan and Isabela). ·
The precise nUmQer of troops assigned
to these stations undoubted.
.
ly varied from time to time but in 1892 the Spanish forces in lfugao
totalled 160 more than had been posted .on 'the entire Cordillera
three.years earlier ._1 1 . .
.
.
Though the .individual detachments at .'these posts were not .
large, by utiliz~g ih·e warriors of ~he garrison towns they wer~ a~le
to exert considerabl~ pressure a~a~st rancherias whi~h ;refused to · .
stop head-punting or to pay tribute. Accounts of these: punitive
expeditions make clear- that not only considerable destruction
accompanied th~~' . ~ut als9 .t ~at lfugaos ~ere willing to .ri~~ such·
deyaatation ~ c~cumstances were appropriate!. Many. of:·the more:
isola~- rancherias, for ..example, continued .their way of life as if
the Sp~sh were not in Ifugao, for the _inte11Qitte.-it raid~.- tp~y ·experi~nced had lit~e long-~r1n ~f~ect. ~gidulµ ·of B~tt.i recounted his
experieµce:
. .
.
•
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Our r~gion is far from any of these ·posts. and the only
time we ·fel~ the hand of the Spaniards was when our
· enemies
were able to enlist their aid against us in retaliation
•
for our head-hunting and slave-catching. Then a detachment
of Spaniards, accompanied by warriors from the offended
village or region, would come . down on us suddenly and
burn· houses anc;l catch pigs and perhaps kill a-few people
who were slQw in taking to the forest. The Ifugaos accom- ·
panying the expedition would behead the slain and cut off
their hands and feet as ,well. They never burned our villages
in Bitu, but they burned villages in the neighboring region ,
of Hingyon, ·and our kin there took refuge with us until
th~y could rebuild their houses.12
While some rancherias were thus shielded by distance, others
were placed in dire straits when their neighbors became hosts of a
Spanish garrison. The Spanish tended to pay·little or no attention
to the complaints of other distrJots against the Ifugaos of Kiangan
•
and as a result ·many debts went uncollected as the Kiangans took
advantage of Spanish protection to evade payment. Nagacaran was
located only five• kilometers from Kiangan and was linked to it
through ties of marriage and blood but developed bitter hatred for
the Spanish and for the Kiangans whom the Nagacarans accused of
inviting them. When the Kiangans refused to honor their debts the
Nagacarans began to .take heads 'in retaliation. The Kiangans complained to the Spanish comma~der about their vicious neighbors, · .
presumably .without explaining the true genesis of the ac·ts, and he
agreed that the . Nagacararis · should be punished. The first ·Spanisb
force sent to retaliate was am bushed and annihilated· by the Naga.carans, only· five of 40 soldiers reportedly making it back to
Kiangan. A larger expedition followed, burned Nagacaran. to the
ground, killed a number of people, and SJ?arked c;,ne of the longest" .
..
lasting ·e nmities ·in lfugao.13
lfugaos of the garrison towns also appear to have enlisted Spanish assistance in raids against their own enemies and this alliance
seems to have persuaded at least one victimized. region to band ·
together .for the purpose of retaliation asainst ho.t h the Spanish
troops and the Ifugao rancheria. which .persuaded the soldiers to
fight their battles; In escalation of an older Centr-1
Ifugao rivalry,
,
Banaue and its civil guard post was attacked by an allied force from
downstream rancherias headed by. Kababuyan. Bugan of Hingyon
8

related the following story. of ·that fight: :
At about this time there was a great expedition otf all the
regions along our tributary · against Benawol. ·M y brother
Aduri.glay went along. The expeditio.n ended disastrously
beeau~ the men disregarded bad omens along .the way.
Abo1;1t a hundred people were killed by the Benawol-folk.
After that the Spaniards came with the Benawol people
and ·burned villages in Kababuyan, Mampolya and Hingyon.
They w.e nt first to Mampolya; the folk there fled to ·t he
mountains, but didn't have time to take ·nearly all their pigs
and chickens with them. The Spaniards and their Benawol
.allies burned the villages, sparing o~y the one: where they ·
stayed overnight. That night, Pangel and some companions
slipped· into the outskirts of the village and killed a Spaniard
and took his head ... The Spaniards went back to Benawol,
but they came back and made a surprise a~tack on Hingyon.
My brother Adunglay and other Hingyon men killed two
Benawol men. The Spaniards carried . away· many pigs,
chickens, . valuable gongs · and jars, and burned many villages ...14
Even the garrison towns which pragmatically allied themselves
with the Spanish did not escape Spanish occupation unscathed.
Though they gained security from the soldiers' presence and· increased their chances-of success in head-raiding by having Spanish
allies~ they were subject to payment of tribute. In addition, mem- .
ories survive throughout Ifugao of the maltreatment of lfugaos by
Spanish'·a nd lowland. soldiers, and this type of oppression seems to
have been at least as common in garrison towns as in outlying
rancherias. A strongly ··w orded protest sent by the Kiangan priest
Juan Villaverde to the ·Kiangan troop commander Juan de la Plaza
in 1896 supports the Ifugao recollections. The · troops, Villaverde
complains in his letter, are:
daily in one village ot another, demanding. or taking palay
[.rice] , pigs or chic kens as they wish, and carrying these
things off whether their owners like ·it · or not, throwing
them a nalf-peso piece, for · example, for something ·worth
two or more pesos; ~d if any of them try ·to defend their
property .rights, .they ru~ ~he immediate risk of being ·shot
9

and killed, as seems to have happened not so long ago in the
village of Anao where they killed an Igorot for a matter of
one hen he tried to prevent.their taking ... And this taking
palay or whatever by these means and by· force sometimea
causes .us casualties ·as happened in Hapao not along qo
when an Igorot apparently lost his head during an argument
over palay and killed a soldier .15
These abuses, r.ecorded in Villaverde's letter and in oral
accounts by Ifugaos, highlight the contrast between Spaniah practices on the Cordillera and the more sympathetic ltate11aents of
. colonial policy issued in Manila. The docum~nts pro·Yided the
Igorots· with..considerably more ·humanitarian treatment than they
actually received. In one instance, even the fact of Ifugao independence anq the likelihood of opposition to Spanish subjugation was
viewed with remarkable tolerance by Governor-General Weyler in
his 1889 letter of instructions to the commandant in Kiangan:
The Politico-Military Commandant must remember that
he will be exercising his authority over pagans who do not
know the benefits of good government and who, even when
they do know it, may in many cases prefer the savage. independence in which they have lived and have seen their
ancestors live.16
Weyler's further injunctions presaged in· several ways the policies which would be adopted by the Americans on the Cordillera.
The Kiangan commander was advised to impose his authority
lightly, not rigorou.sly, and to establish schools and open roads since
Weyler believed that, asid.e from religion, nothing subdued savages
faster than open communications. Labor, though forced and· un~
paid, was to be used in the seasons most convenient for the Ifugaos,
the dignity of their leaders was to be demonstrated by deference
and rewards, inter-village disputes were to be settled with complete
justice and good morals, and the highlanders were to be protected
against abuses by lowlanders or even Christian officials. As the
Americans were to· discover, such ameliorative measures did help
to win Ifugao cooperation. Unfortunately, the Spanish not only
failed to carry them out, but also included a~·o ng these .beneficial
proposals unpopular policies of taxation, relocation and Christianization which undid any good will which might otherwise have
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accrued to the government. Weyler enjoined the ·Kiangan commander to ''cooperate fully with the missionary· fathers; regroup
[the Ifugaos] into settlements little by little .. ·. [and] collect
some token of vassalage or dependence. ''17 ·
From the beginning of the Spanish effort to conquer the lfugaos these three policies 'h ad provoked the greatest resistance, but
after 140 years of failure Weyler was still advocating them. They
continued to ·be unpalatable t;o the lfugaos and contributed to the
enthusiasm with which the lfugaos expelled the last Spanish forces
in 1897.
· When the Philippine Rev.o lution broke out in 1896 a number of
troops assigned to Ifugao and other places on the ·Cordillera were
withdraw·n in order to assist in the battles against Filipino revolu-.
tionaries in the provinces surrounding Manila. ·Licyayu, a .h eadman
of Banaue, recalled the soldiers' departure from the post in Banaue
because of an event illustrative of the relations between the civil
guards stationed there and the Banaue people. The garrison slaughtered its cattle in order to take the meat along. They left only ·the
heads and legs, but when the Banaue people approached intending
to salvage even these few remains, the soldiers threw rocks at them,
driving them away. The detachment withdrew to Kiangan without
being attacked, but the Banaue lfugaos were haPRY to see them.
leave.18
The soldiers who did remain in lfugao after the withdrawal of
the outlying garrisons were· soon in per~ as word spread that other
people were also fighting the Spanish. For the garrisons remaining
in Kiangan and Payawan ·( on the Nueva Vizcaya border) the end
came on a Sunday. While the troops were kneeling at mass ·t he
Ifugaos fell on them and massacred them all.19 Padre Villaverde
•
".'as ·not- killed and was permitted to leave safely. ·His convento
(mission house) and rifle Villaverde entrusted to one of his Ifugao
communicants, C~elo Saquing,20 before departing for Nueva
Vizcaya escorted by Kiangan headman Rafael Bulayungan.
Rafael Bulayungan•s personal history is interesting for it reveals
a little-known aspect of lfugao participation 'in
Spanish government of Kiangan. He was' baptized at the age of 15 by Juan Villaverde, who also gave him the· Christian name of Rafael. Viilav~de
had established a mission school in Kiangan (complete with a Singer
sewing machine brought in by. Villaverde's associate Father.Mal11mbres) and Bulayungan, along with 35 or _more Ifugaos, learned. t;o
read~ write and converse in Spanish. According to American records
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Bulayungan was fluent in Spanish and at the turn of the century
was the best-€ducated Ifugao in the province. He held the positions
of government clerk and road foreman from .1893. .1895, and during
the last two years of Spanish rule w.a s appointed Justice .of the
Peace, Acting .Judge. of the Court of First
Instance and Cabeza de
,
Barangay (vjJJ.age headman). During the latter part of 1899 Bulayungan was formally recognized as the presidente (mayor) of
Kiangan by the independent Filipino government of Nueva Vizcaya
and, as later chapters will show, he continued to hold. positions of
influence under the American authorities.21
.• In addition to establishing a school, the Spanish must be ere.
dited with' the .baptism (if not conversion) of several hundred IfugaQs and with the construction of foot trails (with forced Ifugao
labor) which e~tended from· Isabela to Mayoyao and from Bontoc
through Hapao to . Banaue and Kiangan. The · multi-talented priest
Juan Villaverde supervised lfugao construction of an excellently
graded horse trail which connected Kiangan to the lowlands of
Nueva Vizcaya. Also during the Spanish period a substantial body ·
of information about Ifugao had been accumulated in the form , of
maps, official reports and friar-au tbored acco\}nts of lfugao life and
customs. Much of this material proved valuable to Americans, formulating a differ~nt colonial policy toward the people of the Cordillera.
In general, however, the 150-year effort to bring the lfugaos
un.d er Spanish dominjon has to be considered a failure. After much
effart the province had b~en pe~etrated militarily b~ t Ifugao r~sistance to Spanish sovereignty w-as n~ver overcome. With the help of
the Ifugao warriors in garrison towns the Spanish were able to exert
pressure on nearby ranch_e rias and obtain irregular payment$. of
tribute or lfugao services for trail construction, but the Spanis~
presence in lfugao was µever mor~ th~ a tenuous military occupation of the highlands by lqwlanq-based soldiers. Dark memories of
tha cruelty and oppression of t~·e period remain strong• 80 ye.ars or
more after the events transpired._In th~ long run, however, the most
damaging heritage of this era was lfl:lgao bitterness toward lowland
Filipinos.. While som~ of this feeling is dou.btless at.t ributable to a
common Southeast Asian, and perhaps wprldwide, ~tipathy between .m ountaineer and · plainsman, the abuses perpetrated against
the lfugaos by Filipino troops of the Spanish gurisons created ·an
enmity which is strong even today. · .
· With ·the elhnina~ion of ~e Spanish garrison$ head-hunting
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flared up across Ifugao since old scores could once more be settled
~ithout the interference of outside forces. Banaue was again
attacked by a war party from several Kababuyan rancherias in what
was probably the biggest single battle in lfugao b~fore World War II.
Though · Banaue won, losses on both sides were sobering. Most
reliable reports estimate 200 heaqs were lost. In another chapter of
the Kiangan-Nagacaran feud, the Nagacar3:ns attacked Kiangan vowing to take Kiangan h~ds and burn the deserted (but presumably
symbolic) convento. Rafael Bulayungan led ._the Kiangan defense
and won himself a great reputation for .bravery by inflicting heavy
casualties and driving off the Nagacarans with the aid of rifles captured from the Spanish.22
.In fact, the period· between. the de~eat of the ·_S panish and the
imposition of A~erican authority involved some of the most
intense warfare in Ifugao history. Dr. Dayid Barrows, an early
Americ~n explorer qf Ifugao,' described .graphically the tumultU:oqs
conditions which confronted th~ first Am.e ricans to visit the lfugaos. He reported from Kiangan th.at ''feud is raging everywhere
since the withdrawal of the Sp~nish garrisons ..People do not dare go
beyo:s;id theit immediate circle of towns and -w ork in the fields with
.their spears. ''23
.
In the mountains of lfugaq both the Spanish and the Americans
faced the Qifficult task of imposing the~ authority upon inde.p endent and defiant Ifugao warriors. The.Ifugaos in each case .were confrc;>nt~ with white-~kinned outsiders who. arrogated ~o themselves
the right to redirect Ifugao behavior and alter centuries-old patterns
of existence. Yet .lfugao perceptions of th~ Americans are _as positive as their memc;>ries of the Spanish are negative. · T-h is study
examines the development of this remarkable IfugaQ esteem for the
American apos by looking at the Ifugao-American relationship
thr.ough the eyes of th·e participants themselves.
I .
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